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Improving Invertebrate Welfare
Abstract
Mikhalevich and Powell (2020) argue that it is both scientifically and
morally wrong to dismiss the evidence for sentience in invertebrates,
though they refrain from offering any insights into how their welfare
may be considered or improved. Here, we draw on animal welfare
science to make several suggestions on possible ways forward in this
area, in particular to avoid the demandingness objection by showing
that these need not require overly demanding actions.
In their target article, Mikhalevich and Powell (2020) review the extant lit-
erature on invertebrate sentience to undermine the widespread assumption
that invertebrates are a ‘lower class’ of life and hence do not require the
protection we grant to vertebrates. They bring together current findings in
invertebrate cognition, physiology and behaviour to argue that there is suf-
ficient evidence to grant that at least some invertebrates possess the type
of sentience necessary for welfare consideration. Their goal, however, was
not to answer the more practical question of how invertebrate welfare can be
improved:
Our goal here has not been to determine whether invertebrates
can suffer under specific experimental conditions or live well in
others; rather, we addressed a more foundational question: whether
these animals are capable of suffering or flourishing at all.
– Mikhalevich and Powell (2020: 18)
Once we have established that there is sufficient evidence for sentience in a
species (or, as suggested by Birch 2017, an order), there is then a further
question as to what we should do about this. This contains both a moral
and a practical question. The moral question concerns what sort of moral
status we should award to a species, given that it is sentient - that is, what
role should these animals play in our moral deliberations? Although this is
an interesting question, and one on which there is much to say, it is not the
one we will address here. Instead, we look at the practical question, i.e. how
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we can act to improve the lives of these animals, a question that was not
covered in their paper. In this commentary we will draw on animal welfare
science to provide a quick look at what such recommendations may look like.
One worry about admitting concern for invertebrate welfare is that it
may be too demanding. That is, that there are so many invertebrates used
in so many ways, that it would require radical changes in the political and
public sphere in order to protect them. As Mikhalevich and Powell argue,
this is not reason enough to deny admission to the moral community. We
further contend that moral consideration of invertebrates does not have to be
as demanding as may be presumed. In particular, we should not presuppose
that awarding moral status to invertebrates places duties on us that we don’t
even apply to non-human vertebrates. The existence of trade-offs between
human and non-human interests have long been recognized and we can also
grant that something may be harmful, without considering it impermissible.
Take for instance the example of zoo management euthanasia (Browning
2018), a practice that has received much criticism but may be permissible in
the face of other countervailing values.
Consider the worry they cite from Carruthers (2007): that moral con-
sideration of invertebrates would lead to an obligation to take on the Jain
practice of constantly sweeping the floor in front of us in order to ensure
we never step on an insect. But it is not the case that this necessarily fol-
lows from moral recognition. On the one hand, we could recognize sentience
in insects while denying them the awareness and higher-order cognition of
persisting through time that creates future-regarding preferences. This thus
diminishes the harm caused through premature death (Browning and Veit
2020) and decreases our duty to avoid doing so (though we reject the ar-
gument of McMahan 2002 that it would eliminate it completely). However,
even if we were to take premature death as a more significant harm, it would
still not necessarily follow that we must take substantial actions to prevent
it.
For example, it is a well-known fact that driving cars results in many
deaths for mammalian species (see e.g. Coffin 2007 for the ecological impact
of roadkill). This is not taken to be sufficient reason to cease driving, despite
the fact that we are certain these are sentient animals and have welfare we
otherwise wish to protect. The request to stop driving would be simply too
demanding and thus not morally required. We could similarly acknowledge
that while it is harmful to insects to be stepped on, it is too demanding to
take measures to ensure this is entirely prevented and thus while we should
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not deliberately step on insects where we can avoid doing so, we are not
required to sweep our paths to this end. Simply because invertebrates are
granted some moral status, it does not automatically follow that this requires
us to make large sacrifices on their behalf.
Instead, we can look at some of the small and feasible ways in which
we can take invertebrate welfare into consideration. There is of course not
space here to even begin to explore the range of policies that might be rel-
evant to invertebrate welfare. However, we will provide a few examples of
what this could look like. In particular, animal welfare science will be cru-
cial for providing an understanding of how to achieve improved welfare for
invertebrates. Animal welfare science is concerned with discovering the con-
ditions under which an animal will suffer or flourish. Naturally, the science
of invertebrate welfare would be intricately connected with the science of
invertebrate sentience. In particular, the types of sentient experience that
invertebrates are capable of will determine the range of possible benefits and
harms. Take, for example, the controversy over whether some insects can feel
pain (Klein and Barron 2016; Adamo 2016; Sneddon et al. 2014; Eisemann
et al. 1984). If it turns out that they cannot, then perhaps we do not need
to be concerned about causing tissue damage to these animals, but if they
experience other states such as hunger and thirst, we should be concerned
about ensuring adequate provision of food and water. What is important
here is determining what interests the animals in question possess - what
makes their lives go better or worse.
One potential example is in the use of pest control. The fact that, say,
cockroaches are capable of suffering does not mean that we are forbidden from
killing them to prevent outbreaks in homes or food storage areas. However,
we may want to minimise or prevent the use of neurotoxins that cause a
prolonged death and instead investigate quicker and more humane methods
of killing (this has been the focus of recent work by the Wild Animal Initiative
(Howe 2019)). This is similar to work done in the humane control of rodents
(Littin et al. 2014). These are species which are known to be sentient and
capable of suffering, but this does not prevent the practice of pest control
entirely, rather just guides how it is carried out.
Another example is the use of invertebrates in research, such as looking
at appropriate methods of analgesia for use in painful experiments (Cooper
2011), the same way in which this is typically required for vertebrate species
(National Research Council 2011). It may also require a revision of the call of
‘replacement’ under the 3Rs (Russell and Burch 1959) to, wherever possible,
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replace vertebrates with invertebrates, as we would consider the latter to also
be potentially harmed in research. We might also call for improved housing
conditions for captive invertebrates, whether in research, agriculture or zoos,
providing appropriate shelter areas, diet and enrichment, depending on their
specific needs and desires (see e.g. Crook 2013; Horvath et al. 2013).
These are just some broad suggestions, but we hope that they give
some indication as to some feasible ways in which invertebrate sentience and
welfare could be given practical consideration in everyday behaviour and
decision-making. More specific examples and suggestions will come from
research into the capacities and requirements of different invertebrates (see
e.g. Carere and Mather 2019). More specific proposals have, for instance,
already been given for octopuses as a result of our increasing knowledge as to
their capacities and preferences (Browning 2019). Importantly, it is clearly
not impossible to take some action to improve the lives of sentient inver-
tebrates, and thus we should not let the demandingness objection prevent
progress on this front. Tests such as cognitive bias tests (see Mendl et al.
2009, 2010) that have been developed in mammals can in many cases be
straightforwardly applied to invertebrates (as has already been done in bees
(Bateson et al. 2011)), thus providing us with evidence as to what can im-
prove or decrease their welfare. Sentience researchers should therefore engage
with welfare scientists to begin the process of discovery of those conditions
that harm and benefit different invertebrates, so we know how to take their
welfare into consideration.
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